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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) NOS. 43377 & 43378 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, )  
     ) CANYON COUNTY NOS. CR 2012-4140 & 
v.     ) CR 2013-7560 
     ) 
SANTANA MARINA CROSLAND,) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
     ) 
 Defendant-Appellant. ) 
___________________________) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 After Santana Marina Crosland pled guilty to possession of a controlled 
substance, the district court sentenced her to six years, with two years fixed, and 
retained jurisdiction. Ms. Crosland was on probation for two other offenses during this 
time. The district court revoked probation, executed the sentences, and retained 
jurisdiction. These sentences were to be served concurrently. After a rider review 
hearing, the district court placed Ms. Crosland on probation for possession of a 
controlled substance and reinstated her probation on the two prior offenses. 
Ms. Crosland now appeals from her judgment of conviction, arguing the district court 
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence. 
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Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 In August of 2012, Ms. Crosland was placed on probation, with an underlying 
sentence of four years, with two years fixed, following her guilty plea to possession of a 
controlled substance (“2012 case”). (R., pp.64–67.) In October of 2013, Ms. Crosland 
was placed on probation, with an underlying sentence of five years, with two years 
fixed, following her guilty plea to burglary (“2013 case”). (R., pp.229–31.) This sentence 
would be served concurrent with the sentence in the 2012 case. (R., p.229.) Due to the 
burglary conviction, the district court found that Ms. Crosland violated her probation in 
the 2012 case and revoked, reinstated, and extended her probation for four years with 
the same terms and conditions as the 2013 case. (R., pp.113–14.)  
In January of 2014, the State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging that 
Ms. Crosland committed the crime of possession of a controlled substance (“2014 
case”). (R., pp.293–94.) Ms. Crosland waived a preliminary hearing, and the magistrate 
bound her over to district court. (R., pp.301, 303.) The State filed an Information 
charging Ms. Crosland with possession of a controlled substance. (R., pp.304–05.) The 
State also filed a Petition for Probation Violation in the 2012 and 2013 cases. (R., 
pp.115–20, 233–28.) Ms. Crosland pled guilty to possession, and she admitted to 
violating her probation. (R., pp.272–74, 336–44, 372.) As part of the plea agreement, 
the parties would recommend “a significant in-patient treatment of no less than 90 days 
rather than the recommended period of retained jurisdiction.” (Tr., p.6, Ls.22–25.) At the 
joint sentencing and disposition hearing, the district court revoked Ms. Crosland’s 
probation in the 2012 and 2013 cases, imposed the underlying sentences, and retained 
jurisdiction. (Tr., p.35, L.8–p.36, L.5.) For the 2014 case, the district court sentenced 
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Ms. Crosland to six years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (Tr., p.36, 
Ls.6–20, p.37, Ls.7–10.) This sentence would be served concurrent to the sentences in 
the 2012 and 2013 cases. (R., pp.153–55, 276–78, 372–74.) On March 30, 2015, the 
district court entered a separate judgment for each case. (R., pp.153–55, 276–78, 372–
74.)  
On April 2, 2015, Ms. Crosland moved for reconsideration of her sentences in all 
three cases pursuant to Rule 35, specifically requesting that the district court place her 
on probation instead of retaining jurisdiction. (R., pp.375–77.) On May 7, 2015, the 
district court denied her motion. (R., pp.381–88.)  
On June 17, 2015, Ms. Crosland filed a timely notice of appeal from the district 
court’s judgment in the 2014 case and its order denying Ms. Crosland’s Rule 35 
motion.1 (R., pp.390–93.) An amended notice of appeal was filed on August 18, 2015. 
(R., pp.404–07.) The Supreme Court issued an order consolidating all three cases. 
(R., p.409.) On December 8, 2015, the district court held a rider review hearing. 
(Aug. R.,2 pp.1, 4, 7.) The district court suspended execution of Ms. Crosland’s 
sentence in all three cases and placed her on probation for four years. (Aug. R., pp.1, 4, 
7.) 
                                            
1 Ms. Crosland does not challenge on appeal the district court’s order denying her Rule 
35 motion. 
2 A Motion to Augment the Record with the district court’s Orders of Probation on 
Suspended Execution of Judgment after Retained Jurisdiction is filed 
contemporaneously with this brief. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of six 
years, with two years fixed, upon Ms. Crosland, following her guilty plea to possession 
of a controlled substance?  
 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Six 
Years, With Two Years Fixed, Upon Ms. Crosland, Following Her Guilty Plea To 
Possession Of A Controlled Substance 
 
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an 
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court 
imposing the sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. 
Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Ms. Crosland’s 
sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum. See I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1) (maximum 
of seven years). Accordingly, to show that the sentence imposed was unreasonable, 
Ms. Crosland “must show that the sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is 
excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 
(2002).  
“Reasonableness of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be 
tailored to the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 
445, 483 (2012) (quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)). 
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an 
independent review of the entire record available to the trial court at 
sentencing, focusing on the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) 
protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public; (3) 
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for 
wrongdoing. 
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Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to 
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the 
related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 
122, 132 (2011).  
Ms. Crosland asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing an 
excessive sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, she contends 
the district court should have sentenced her to a lesser term of imprisonment in light of 
the mitigating factors, including her substance abuse issues, mental health issues, and 
abusive childhood.  
Twenty-four-year-old Ms. Crosland grew up in an extremely abusive and 
dysfunctional home. Ms. Crosland’s biological mother gave her up when she was eight 
months old. (Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”),3 p.80.) She left Ms. Crosland 
with a neighbor, who called the police and located Ms. Crosland’s father. (PSI, p.80.) 
Ms. Crosland’s father physically abused her as a child, beating her with leather belts 
and the end of a hammer. (PSI, p.79.) He would not stop beating her until her step-
mother intervened. (PSI, p.79.) Her father also mentally abused her, such as calling her 
racial slurs. (PSI, p.79.) He would tell Ms. Crosland to go live with her mother and then 
chase her down when she tried to leave. (PSI, p.79.) Ms. Crosland’s father was once 
incarcerated for child neglect. (PSI, p.79.) Ms. Crosland’s step-mother was mentally 
abusive as well. (PSI, p.79.) She would repeatedly disown Ms. Crosland and blame her 
for the family’s problems. (PSI, p.79.) Ms. Crosland’s step-mother is dying from kidney 
                                            
3 Citations to the PSI refer to the 214-page electronic document containing the 
confidential exhibits, titled “Crosland Exhibits #43377.” 
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failure, but she is too obese for surgery. (PSI, p.79.) Her step-mother takes “a lot of 
prescription drugs.” (PSI, p.79.)  
Although Ms. Crosland lived mostly with her father and step-mother, she still had 
contact with her mother as a child. (PSI, p.194.) For example, Ms. Crosland was 
sexually abused as a child because, when she was just four years old, her mother 
“would trade her and her sister for drugs.” (PSI, p.80.) Her mother is an alcoholic and 
uses heroin and methamphetamine. (PSI, p.80.) Further, when Ms. Crosland was eight 
years old, her mother told her “out of spite” that her father might not be her biological 
father. (PSI, p.59.)  
At eight years old, Ms. Crosland starting seeing a counselor for anger issues. 
(PSI, pp.85, 191.) She has had five prior hospitalizations for mental health issues. (PSI, 
pp.58, 191.) Ms. Crosland reported in a 2013 presentence investigation that she had 
been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, anxiety, and bi-polar 
disorder. (PSI, p.85.) At age eleven, Ms. Crosland tried methamphetamine for the first 
time with her biological mother. (PSI, pp.87–88, 175.) She also smoked marijuana as a 
teenager. (PSI, pp.87–88.) At age eighteen, Ms. Crosland was injecting 
methamphetamine on a daily basis. (PSI, p.58.) She would also smoke 
methamphetamine. (PSI, pp.87–88.) The GAIN-I Referral and Recommendation 
Summary diagnosed Ms. Crosland with amphetamine dependence with physiological 
symptoms. (PSI, p.175.)  
Ms. Crosland was also in a number of abusive and violent relationships. (PSI, 
pp.81–82.) One of her first relationships “ended in violence” and another boyfriend 
“became someone she didn’t know” due to drug use. (PSI, pp.82–82.) Her current 
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boyfriend has locked her in a trunk or a cage, stomped on her face, and choked her. 
(PSI, p.82.) In July of 2013, Ms. Crosland tried to kill herself by slitting her wrists after 
she got angry and upset with him. (PSI, p.148.)   
Ms. Crosland’s abusive childhood, substance abuse, and mental health issues 
are proper considerations in favor of mitigation. A sentencing court must give “proper 
consideration of the defendant’s [substance abuse] problem, the part it played in 
causing defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for treating the 
problem.” State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). The impact of substance abuse on the 
defendant’s criminal conduct is “a proper consideration in mitigation of punishment upon 
sentencing.” State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 n.5 (1981). Further, Idaho Code § 19-
2523 requires the sentencing court to consider the defendant’s mental health condition 
if it is a significant factor, and the record must show that the sentencing court 
adequately considered this factor when imposing a sentence. I.C. § 19-2523; Delling, 
152 Idaho at 132–33. Finally, the Court of Appeals has recognized that a defendant’s 
“extremely troubled childhood is a factor that bears consideration at sentencing.” 
State v. Williams, 135 Idaho 618, 620 (Ct. App. 2001). In light of this information of 
Ms. Crosland’s traumatic childhood, substance abuse, and mental health issues, 
Ms. Crosland submits the district court abused its discretion by imposing an 
unreasonable sentence. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Ms. Crosland respectfully requests that this Court reduce her sentence as it 
deems appropriate. Alternatively, she requests that her case be remanded to the district 
court for a new sentencing hearing. 
 DATED this 21st day of January, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      JENNY C. SWINFORD 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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